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bank might be ruined, for as it pays
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checks in the order of their presentation, the account might have been paid
while a prior check was outstanding, of
which they had no knowledge, and for
the payment of which they were still
bound. This view is so absurd that it
will not be advanced. Is the contract
made by a presentment of the holder for
payment? Manifestly not, for then the
bank is simply called upon to fulfil a
duty or obligation which is assumed to
Prehave been previously incurred.
sentment for payment ex vi termini involves the notion of an already existing
obligation to pay a debt to the presentor,
except where payment is* voluntary.
Does the contract arise when the bank
refuses payment? Then it is believed
to be the only case in the law when that

Mass. ; Ballard vs. Randall, 1 Gray 606;
Bellamy vs. Marjoribanks, 7 Exch. R.
404, per PARKE, B. ; Chapman vs. White,
2 Selden 412. The text writers on bills
and notes uniformly express themselves
in the same manner. Without doubt,
the bank is'liable to the depositor for all
the damages sustained by its refusal to pay a check which he had a right to
draw. Marzetti vs. Williams, 1 B. &
Ad. 415. No claim can be made by the
holder of an uncertified check that it
can operate in his favor as an assignment to him of so much money as the
check represents. This proposition has
been often decided. See the leading
case of Dykers vs. Leather Manufacturers' Bank, 11 Paige 616.
IV. The proposition in the .principal
case, that the identity of the name of
the drawer of the check and of the president of the bank is sufficient to put the
holder on his guard, is sustained by
Hatcher vs. Rocheleau, 18 N. Y. 86;
Jackson vs. Goes, 13 Johns. 518, per
SPENCER, J.; Jackson vs. King, 5 Cow.
237; 9 Id. 140.

which was not a contract before becomes such by a refusal to contract.
Clearly then the holder has no remedy
against. the bank. The authorities and
dicta which hold that an acceptance is
necessary before the holder can bring
his action are, among others, National
Bank vs. Eliot Bank, 5 Am. Law Regis-
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ARBON AND ANOTHER vs. FUSSELL.'
An agreement for the hire by defendant from plaintiffs of a pair of carriage-horses
for twelve months, the defendant to give three months' notice previous to the
expiration of the year of her intention to give up the horses, was prepared in
duplicate, and one part signed by plaintiffs was sent by them to defendant by
her servant, and the other part signed by defendant was retained by plaintiffs.
Defendant having given up the horses without notice, plaintiffs brought an
action against her on the agreement. Having lost their part, plaintiffs gave
1 7 Law Times, N. S. 283.
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notice to defendant to produce her part of the agreement at the trial, which was
not complied with, nor was any evidence given as to where it was.
It being proved that it was not stamped when sent by plaintiffs to defendant,
WILDE, B., refused to admit secondary evidence of its contents; whereupon
plaintiffs proceeded to give evidence of a custom in the trade that it was usual
for the hirer, under such circumstances, to give a three months' notice. The
jury, however, negatived the existence of such a custom, and found a verdict
for defendant:
Held, that WILDE, B., was right in rejecting secondary evidence of the contents
of the document; and that, as it was proved to have been unstamped at the time
it was sent by plaintiffs to defendant, the proper presumption was that it remained still unstamped; and the fact of the defendant's not producing it at the
trial after notice so to do, afforded, under the circumstances, no ground for the
presumption that it had been subsequently stamped:
The evidence as to the custom of the trade was beside the point which the jury
had to determine, and when it was found that the document bore no stamp, the
plaintiffs should have been nonsuited.
Per CHANNELL, B.-A written contract governs the rights of the parties to it, and
cannot be varied, added to, or qualified; with one exception, that in some cases
the custom of a trade may be annexed as incident to the contract; that is, not
where the custom contradicts the contract, but where it is consistent with it.

[The pleadings in the case are omitted, as not necessary to its
comprehension.]
At the trial, before WILDE, B., and a special jury, at the Middlesex sittings after Trinity Term, the following facts appeared:The plaintiffs were jobmasters, near Portman-square, and the
defendant a lady of independent fortune, residing occasionally in
London, and at other times in different parts of the country, had
hired horses of the plaintiffs on the terms of an agreement, which
defendant alleged had been come to six months'after the hiring,
under the following circumstances: On 8th January, 1857, defendant sent her coachman to plaintiffs to know the rate at which
horses were supplied, and in reply plaintiffs gave the coachman
their terms in a note, which defendant called a "proposal," but
which was as follows :-" Mem. of agreement made 8th January,
1857, between Mrs. Fussell, of, &c., on the one part, and James
Arbon & Son, of, &c., on the other part. Mrs. F. agrees to take,
and J. A. & Son agree to let, a pair of carriage horses for three
months, eighty-four days, for the sum of twenty guineas per month;
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but should Mrs. F. desire to keep the said horses for six months
of twenty-eight days, then at the rate of eighteen guineas per
month, or if for twelve months of 365 days, the rate to be 1501. per
year. J. A. & Son to shoe and forage the said horses." It was
not signed by either party. Defendant arranged to take the horses,
but signed no agreement as to the time for which she would take
them, nor was any time then named. After six months the coachman called again on plaintiffs, to say Mrs. F. would take them for
twelve months, whereupon plaintiffs prepared an agreement in
duplicate, and sent it by the coachman to the defendant for approval. Defendant returned the agreement signed by her, and
plaintiffs forwarded to her, by the coachman, the duplicate signed
by them. It was dated 8th January, 1857, and was to the following effect :-" Mrs. F. agrees to take, and J. A. & Son agree to
let, a pair of carriage horses for one year for the sum of 1501.,
with six guineas for the use of utensils. A. & Son to forage and
shoe the said horses when in London, and to allow 28s. per week
for the keep, &c., of the said horses when out of London. A. &
Son further agree, should either or both the said horses fall ill or
lame, to provide others in their place on their being returned home.
Mrs. F. also further agrees to give three months' notice previous
to the expiration of the year, or of any future year, of her intention to give up the horses."
Under this agreement the defendant continued to use the horses
until December, 1859, when she gave them up without notice. In
November, 1859, defendant's coachman was driving her carriage
with plaintiffs' horses, when one of them was injured and died in
consequence of a collision with a van, and which, as plaintiffs
were informed by defendant's coachman and butler, arose from the
careless driving of the vanman. Relying on the statements so
made to them, plaintiffs brought an action against the owner of the
van to recover damages, but failed in consequence of its appearing
on the trial that the acciden't arose from the careless driving of
defendant's coachman.
Plaintiffs having lost their duplicate of the agreement signed
by defendant, WILDE,. ., refused to admit secondary evidence of
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its contents to be given, it being proved not to have been stamped.
Plaintiffs' counsel then proposed to give secondary evidence of the
duplicate signed by plaintiffs and sent to defendant, notice to produce it having been given to defendant, and not having been complied with, and no evidence having been given as to where it was.
But, it being elicited, on cross-examination by defendant's counsel,
that their part also, when it was given by plaintiffs to the coachman,
was not stamped, the learned Baron refused to receive secondary
evidence of it.
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs were thrown back on the
original agreement, or "proposal," which they'put in, plaintiffs
paying the penalty for stamping it in Court. As this document
contained nothing about notice, they gave evidence of a custom in
the trade that three months' notice of intention to terminate a
yearly hiring was usual; and also of a custom that the hirer was
liable for an injury to the horses occurring through the negligence
of the hirer or his servants.
1
The jury found a verdict for defendant, and against the plaintiffs, on all the questions left to them by the learned judge, viz.,
that there was no general custom in the trade acted on by those
who let and those who hire with regard to the liability of the hirer;
that defendant's coachman was not negligent; that defendant used
the horses in a proper manner; and that there was -no necessity
for a three months' notice; and thereupon WILDE, B., stayed execution, in order to give plaintiffs an opportunity of moving.
Garth (with whom was iuddleston, Q. C.) now imoved for a new
trial on the ground of the improper rejection of evidence, and also
that the verdict was against evidence. It was contended at the
trial, and it was submitted now, that secondary evidence of the
duplicate sent by the coachman was admissible. It was traced to
defendant's possession, notice to produce it was given, and although
it was not stamped when it left plaintiffs' hands, yet it might have
been stamped subsequently, and there was no proof to the contrary,
or that the document was not at that moment in existence in a
stamped state. It was on defendant to prove that it was not. By
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not producing it defendant deprived the Court of the opportunity
of seeing whether it was stamped or not, and'the plaintiffs of having
it stamped if it turned out to be unstamped. The horses were
returned without a three months' notice, and if that agreement had
been put in plaintiffs could have shown by the terms of it the necessity of such a notice. Not having been produced after notice,
when it may possibly have been subsequently stamped, it must, as
against defendant, who refused to produce it, and into whose possession it had been traced, be presumed to have been stamped.
[CHANNELL, B.-It is laid down in Chitty on Stamps that where a
party refuses to 'produce an instrument after notice, the presumption against him is that it was properly stamped until the contrary
appear, and to that effect are the various cases. Now here the
evidence was that when it left plaintiffs' possession the document
was unstamped. That presumption therefore in this case would
be the other way.] Then as to the other point, that the verdict
was against evidence. • We gave evidence of a custom in the trade
that a three months' notice was usual, which was not contradicted,
and though the jury found against plaintiffs on that point, the
judge summed up in plaintiffs' favour upon it. So also we gave
evidence of a custom for the hirer to be responsible in case of an
accident occurring through his negligence, or that of his servant,
and submitted that the accident here clearly arose from the carelessness of the coachman. [POLLOCK, C. B.-You don't want a
custom for that.] The learned judge rather took that view in
summing up, but defendant's counsel urged, that if defendant had
appointed a competent coachman an accident would not render her
liable. On that also the jury found against plaintiffs.
POLLOCK, C. B.-There will be no rule on this case, the facts of
which are very simple. The agreement on which the plaintiffs
originally went was drawn up in duplicate, and the evidence was,
that neither part was stamped when they were signed by the parties.
The plaintiffs had lost their part, and the defendant did not produce
her part on notice to do so at the trial. Mr. Garth has contended
that it should be presumed the defendant's part of the document
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was stamped, and it is proposed that we should admit secondary
evidence of it. I am at a loss to see what foundation there is
under the circumstances for saying that, because defendant did not
produce this document at the trial after notice so to do, therefore
we are to presume that it was stamped, and to admit secondary
evidence of its contents. The question is, what conclusion ought
my brother WILDE to have arrived at? Was he bound to have
received evidence of it as of a stamped document, or to have come
to the conclusion that it was stamped ? I think he was not, and
that he was right in the conclusion to which he came. It may be
that in the case of certain instruments which have been acted on,
and which could not have been acted on without a stamp, and
where there may have been a penalty for not stamping, and where
omnia rite esse acta would apply, that there it may be presumed
that such instruments were duly stamped. But there is no penalty
upon drawing an agreement on unstamped paper, save the inconvenience to the party of being unable to give it in evidence until
the stamp duty and an additional sum by way of fine has been
paid. It is not like the case of a check or a receipt; and where,
moreover, as in this case, the instrument is proved not to have been
stamped when last seen, then, as my brother CHANNELL has shown,
the presumption is that it is still unstamped. On that point I think
the verdict was right, and if it had been for the plaintiffs, the
defendant might have moved to set it aside. In fact, no proceedings ought to have taken place after it was found that the document bore no stamp. As to the custom, I think the verdict on that
was beside the merits of the case, and plaintiffs should have been
nonsuited; but no application has been made to tur the verdict
into a nonsuit. The rule must be refused.
BRAMWELL, B.-I think my brother WILDE was perfectly right
in his ruling. If he was right in coming to the conclusion that
the instrument was not stamped, he was right in keeping it from
the jury. I own I think the proper conclusion to come to under
the circumstances is, that it was not stamped; for it being proved
that it was not stamped when it was sent by .the plaintiffs to the
defendant, the presumption I think is strongly against its having
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been subsequently stamped. As to the other point, I think Mr.
Garth was better off at the trial than he ought to have been, for
his case having -broken down on the agreement opened to the jury,
he said, "I will give evidence of a custom, and fall -back upon
another proposal," and that he was allowed to do instead of being
nonsuited.
B.-I am of the same opinion, that there should be
no rule. I agree with my Lord Chief Baron and my brother
BRAMWELL, that the secondary evidence ought not to have been
received of this contract, and that such evidence, when tendered,
was rightly rejected. Then the point arises, whether a rule should
be granted on the other ground, that the verdict of the jury upon
the question that was Submitted to them was a verdict against the
evidence. That was a verdict by which the jury negatived the
custom of giving three months' notice, which the plaintiff set up.'
I must say that I am very loth at all times to interfere with the
finding of a jury, unless I see that it is clearly wrong. In this
case the evidence was all on one side. We ought to see that the
matter which was submitted to the jury was pertinent to the question which they had to determine. According to my notion, it was
quite beside the question. I am of opinion, that where parties
etiter into a writt6n contract, that written contract governs the rights
of the parties. You cannot vary it; you cannot add to it; you cannot qualify it. There is one exception, namely, that in some cases
you may annex the custom of the trade as an incident to the contract; that is, not where the custom of the trade contradicts the
contract, but where it is a custom that is consistent with it. That
is, where the parties contract with reference to the custonx, where
it is not incorporated in the agreement, but where they have confined the agreement to other matters, you must determine what the
agreement really is, and whether you can annex the custom as an
incident to such an instrument or not. Therefore, I think the
inquiry was immaterial, and that no rule should be granted upon
the ground that the verdict was against the evidence. If they were
justified in doing as they did, there is an end of the application as
to the verdict being against the weight of evidence, and I am not
CHANNELL,
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disposed to grant a new trial unless I see that the inquiry was pertinent to the duty which the jury had to discharge.
Rule refused.
The preceding case, which is condensed from the report in the Law
Times, though not perhaps of much intrinsic importance, may be of use for
future reference on the questions which
must soon arise under therecent Internal
Revenue Act. No doubt much practical
inconvenience in the trial of cases will
be occasioned by the provisions of that
act, and it is well to anticipate them by a
reference to some of the decisions under
similar statutes in England.
It is settled there that where an instrument, actually produced- at Nisi
rius, appears not to have been duly
stamped, it is not to be treated, for that
reason, as non-existent, so as to let in
secondary evidence of its contents. Alcock vs. Delay, 4 Ell. & Bl. 660. This
proposition is sufficiently obvious. It
is not, however, so easy to say how far
such evidence is admissible, on a general allegation and proof of the existence
and loss of an instrument affected by
the stamp laws, or that it is in the
possession of the other party, who has
refused to produce it on call. There
can be no doubt that if the general rule
on the subject were applied without
qualification, there would be a strong
temptation on litigants to make an artificial loss of documents supply the lack
of proper stamps. It is held, notwithstanding, that the presumption in the
case of a lost instrument is, in the first
instance, that it was duly stamped, and
that it lies on the party objecting to
secondary evidence of its contents on
the contrary allegation, to prove the
fact that it was not stamped; and the
same doctrine applies with peculiar
force to the case of an instrument in
the possession of the party which he

fails to pr oduce. Creap vs. Andrson, I
Stark. N. IP. 34; Pooley vs. Goodwin, 4
Ad. & Ell. 94 ; Hart vs. Hart, 1 Hare 1;
Closmadeu c vs. Carrel, 18 Comm. B. 44.
If, however r, it be shown that the instrument was unstamped at the time of its
execution, or at some subsequent time,
the presum ption is rebutted, and it will
then lie o,n the party offering the evidence to show that it was afterwards
stamped within the period allowed by
law. Crowthers vs. Solomons, 6 Comm.
B. 758; Cl()smadeuc vs. Carrel, ut supra.
This, howeever, need not be by direct
proof, but may be rested on any reasonable presiumption of fact. Thus in
Closmadeui c vs. Carrel, ut supra, the
proper sta mp duty on a charter-party
had been paid within the fourteen days
allowed for the purpose by the 5 & 6
Vict. c. 79 , s. 21, and the instrument
left at the office of the distributor of
stamps at C. for transmission by mail
to London to be there stamped; but it
could neve r be found afterwards. There
was no dir ect evidence that it was ever
in fact mailed; but the clerk at C.
testified thiat he always sent off the
documents left with him, by mail on
the same day that he received them. It
was held that this su.cLently raised
the presun nption that the charter-party
had been duly stamped before its loss,
as the different officials by whom the
instrument should have been transmitted
and stampe d, must be taken to have done
their duty.
There is another class of cases on this
subject wi hich might, at first sight,
seem not altogether consistent with
those the r esult of which has just been
stated. TIbus in Slatterlie vs. Pooley, 6
Mees. & W. 664, which vis an action
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on &-covenant on a composition deed,
to indemnify the plaintiff against certain debts set forth in a schedule annexed to the deed, which schedule was
ustamped, it was held that evidence
of an admission by the defendant that
a particular debt in respect to which
the suit was brought, was included in
the schedule, was admissible. This was,
however, put on the ground that the
admissions of a party as to the contents
of an instrument., when competent at

all, are primary and not secondary
evidence. There had been previous
conflicting decisions on this subject
(see & Month. Law 'Mag. 175), which
were settled by this case; and it has
been since followed in Pritchard vs.
Bagshaw, 11 Com. Bench 456, and elsewhere. The general doctrine on the
subject of admissions, in this respect,
will be found stated in 1 Greenl. on Ev.
196.
H. w.

In the Exc eguer Chamber.-Appealfrom the Court of Exchequer.
,_eb. 7th, 1862.
HOLMES V8. CLARKE.

1

Where the fence put round certain mill machinery, required by statute to be
fenced, had been broken, and the owner having notice of the defect was guilty
of negligence in not using reasonable care to have his machinery properly
secured, a servant who had entered into his employment when the machinery
was fenced, and who continued in the service after knowledge that the fence
was gone, in the reasonable expectation, induced by the expressions of the
owner and his manager to him, that the defect would be repaired, without negligence on his own part, met with an injury by reason of the machinery being
unfenced :-Held, that he could maintain an action for the injury against his
employer.

An appeal was brought in this case, by the defendant, to review
the decision of the Court of Exchequer, discharging a rule obtained
by the defendant to enter a verdict for him, or a nonsuit, or for a
new trial.
2
The pleadings and facts are stated at length in the report below,
but the following summary of them will explain the case.
The plaintiff was an under overlooker, employed at weekly wages
131

L. T. Exch. 356.

Decided in the Sittings after Hilary Term, corara CociJ., BYLs, J., and KE.iTnq, J.
2 30 Law J. Rep. (x. s.) Exch. 135.

D'RN, C. J., WIGHTMAN, J., WILaES, J., CRoMrToN,
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by the defendant, a cotton-spinner at Manchester. It was the
plaintiff's duty to oil the machinery in the defendant's' cotton
factory. The mill-gearing was fenced when the plaintiff entered
the service by an iron guard, which had been broken about a year
before the accident mentioned below, and had not been mended
again, although the plaintiff had called the manager's attention to
it, and he had promised it should be repaired, and the defendant
himself had looked at it, and had spoken about having it mended.
While engaged in oiling the machinery the plaintiff's arm was
caught by the machine and torn off.
The action was brought to recover compensation for the injury.
The plea alleged that the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant, and knew that the mill-gearing was unfenced, and that the
injury arose by reason of the plaintiff's own negligence. The jury
negatived any negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and found a
verdict for him, and that the injury was brought about by the want
of proper caution on the part of the defendant.
T. Jones, for the appellant, the defendant below.-The plaintiff
is not entitled to recover. He engaged in the service of the defendant voluntarily, and having accepted the risks incidental to
the employment cannot suehis master for the injury he has met
with in his service. Seymour vs. Maddox, 16 Q. 13. Rep. 326;
S. 0. 20 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 327. The conversation with
the manager about the want of the fence does not alter the legal
position of the parties. Dynen vs. Leach, 6 Hurl. & N. 349; 26
Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 221; Alsop vs. Yates, 2.Hurl. & N. 768;
S. 0. 27 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 156. Had the'plaintiff felt
that he could not do the work safely for want of the fence he ought
to have left the service and not continued in it. Skipp vs. The
Eastern Counties Railway Oompany, 9 Exch. Rep. 223; S. C. 23
Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 23. The effect of the conversation
cannot amount to more than this, that the plaintiff contracted to
remain in the service, and continued to incur the risk of the unfenced machinery until the fence should be replaced. The plaintiff, in fact, contributed to the injury himself, and therefore cannot
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recover. Ile knew of the danger, and yet incurred the risk. His
rashness may be called contributing negligence in one sense. At
any rate, it is negligence sufficient to bar the action, notwithstanding the finding of the jury that the plaintiff was not guilty of
negligence. Caswell v. Worth, 5 El. & B. 849, S. 0. 25 Law J.
Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 121, and Cowley vs. The.Olayor .. , of Sunderland, 6 Hurl. & N. 565, S. 0. 30 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 127.
The Factory Acts, which require masters in manufactories to fence
machinery for the protection of women and children, impose no
such duty in respect of men of full age. Coe vs. Platt, 6 Exch.
Rep. 752, S. 0. 20 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 407, was decided
before the statute 19 & 20 Vict. c. 38 was passed. Suppose in a
colliery there had been some omission of a precaution ordered by
statute for the benefit of apprentices, and a tremendous colliery
accident had happened, and three hundred men killed, but no
apprentice hurt, could it be said that the representatives of each
of those men who had engaged to take the risk of accidents in consideration of their wages could sue the master because the statutable
duty as to apprentices had not been performed ? Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. 748, and Barton Hill Coal Company vs. Beid, 3 Id.
288, do not apply.
Bliss, for the respondent, the plaintiff below.-The action will
lie. It is material that when the plaintiff entered the service the
machinery was duly fenced. The contract, in effect, before the
accident, was that the plaintiff would oil the machinery, and that
the defendant would keep it properly fenced. The plaintiff complained to the manager, which is the same as complaining to the
defendant. Senior vs. Ward, 28 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 139.
He continued in the service under the expectation that it would be
speedily repaired. This is very different from the case of a man
who originally engages to work at dangerous unfenced machinery.
The plaintiff never engaged to take upon himself the risk of unfenced
machinery. The plaintiff's knowledge of the danger cannot affect his
liability unless he consented to incur the risk. Knowledge is not
proof of negligence, only one ingredient in the proof. Clayards vs.
.Dethiek, 12 Q. B. Rep. 439; Thormpson vs. The North-L'asternBail-
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way Company, 30 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 67; 1?oberts vs. Smith. 2
Hurl. & N. 213, S. C. 26 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 319; Mellora
vs. Shaw, 30 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 333; Ashworth vs. Stanwix, Ibid. 183; Priestly vs. Fowler, 3 Mee. & W. 1, S. C. 7 Law
J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 42; Williams vs. Clough, 3 H. L. Cas. 258.
A duty was imposed on the defendant to fence this machinery. In
consequence of the defendant's neglect of this legal duty an injury
has happened to the plaintiff. For that the defendant ought to be
responsible. Though the main object of the Factory Acts was to
protect women and children, the duty they impose on the manufacturer to put up a guard is general. The statute 19 & 20 Vict.
e. 38, only modifies the application of the statute 7 & 8 Vict. c.
15, and does not affect the applicability of the cases decided on it.
Coe vs. Platt and Caswell vs. Worth show that the same right of
action is given to adults as to women and children if any injury
arises from unfenced machinery. When a duty is imposed by
statute, and an injury arises to another from a bieach of that duty,
the person injured is entitled to recover. Crouch vs. Steel, 3 El. &
B. 402; S. C. 23 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 121.
(He was stopped by the Court.)
T. Jones replied.
At the close of the argument
The Court stated that judgment would be given for the plaintiff,
but took time to consider how it should be expressed.
Cur. adv. vult.
Judgment was now delivered by
COCKBURN,

C. J.-In this case I am of opinion that the deci-

sion of the Court of Exchequer should be upheld; though not precisely on the grounds on which that decision appears to have proceeded. I think the question, whether any liability in the defendant arises under the statutes 7 & 8 Vict c. 15 and 19 & 20 Vict. c.
38, is open to considerable doubt, owing to the plaintiff being an
adult. It appears to me, however, unnecessary to decide this question, being clearly of opinion that, independently of any statutory
duty or obligation, there was negligence in the defendant in not
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fencing the machinery on which the plaintiff was employed ; and
although the declaration in this ease is based on the alleged statutory duty of the defendant to fence the machinery, the leave to
move was reserved on the question of negligence, and there is full
power to amend the pleadings, and we can, therefore, so mould the
declaration as to make it applicable to the grounds on which we
think the case should be decided. I consider the doctrine laid
down by the House of Lords in the ease of the Barton's Hill Coal
Comnzany vs. .id, as the law of Scotland with reference to the
duty of a master, as applicable to the law of England also;
namely, that where a servant is employed on machinery, from the
use of which danger may arise, it is the duty of the master to take
due care, and to use all reasonable means to guard against and
prevent any defects, from which increased and unnecessary danger
may arise. No doubt when a servant enters on an employment
from its nature necessarily hazardous, he accepts the service subject to the risks incidental to it, or, if he thinks proper to accept
an employment on machinery defective from its construction or
from the want of proper repair, and with knowledge of the facts
enters on the service, the master cannot be held liable for injury
to the servant within the scope of the danger, which both the contracting parties contemplated as incidental to the employment.
The rule I am laying down goes only to this, that the danger
contemplated on entering into the contract shall not be aggravated
by any omission on the part of the master to keep the machinery
in the condition in which, from the terms of the contract or the
nature of the employment, the servant had a right to expect that
it would be kept. In the present case, at the time the plaintiff
entered on the employment, the machinery was properly fenced;
on its ceasing to be so, the manager of the defendant on the
remonstrance of the plaintiff, promised, in the presence of the
defendant, the master, that the defect should be made good. It
must be taken, therefore, that at the time the contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant was entered into, it was contemplated
by the rarties that the machinery should be fenced. It f-Alows
that through the negligence of the master in omitting to keep the
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machinery fenced the servant has been exposed to danger to which
he ought not to have been exposed; and the injury of which he
complains having thus arisen, the defendant is justly and properly
liable. It was indeed strongly urged upon us, on the part of the
defendant, that as the plaintiff upon becoming aware that the
machinery was no longer properly fenced, instead of refusing to
go on as he might have done, continued to perform his service with
a knowledge of the increased risk to which he was exposed, he must
be taken to have voluntarily incurred the danger, and is therefore
in the same position as if he had originally accepted the service
as one to be performed on unfenced machinery. I am, however,
of opinion that there is a sound distinction between the case of a
servant, who knowingly enters into a contract to work on defective
machinery, and that of one, who on a temporary defect arising, is
induced by the master, after the defect has been brought to the
knowledge of the latter, to continue to perform his service under
the promise that the defect shall be remedied. In the latter
case it seems to me that the servant by no means waives the right
to hold the master responsible for any injury which may arise
to him from the omission of the master to fulfil his obligation.
No doubt a defect thus arising in machinery may be such that
no man of ordinary prudence would run the hazard of working on it. If a jury should find that the party complaining
had materially contributed to the injury by his own rashness,
the action could not be maintained, inasmuch as it is a wellestablished rule that a plaintiff who has materially contributed to
his own injury by his own negligence cannot recover, although he
may show negligence in the opposite party. But the question
whether the injury of which the plaintiff complains is to be ascribed
wholly to the negligence of the defendant, or whether the plaintiff
has had any share in bringing it about, is one only for the jury. In
the present case the jury have determined this question in favor of
the plaintiff, and we are bound by their decision. It is, indeed,
put to us that, notwithstanding this finding of the jury, the knowledge of the plaintiff that the machinery was unfenced is, in point
Of law, sufficient to prevent the plaintiff from recovering. But, I
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am f pir.on, that it is only a fact in tie case to be taken into
coi-idert, ion by the jury with all the other facts and circumstances
in determining tile question, whether the plaintiff has, himself,
helped to bring about the accident, in respect of which he seeks to
charge the defendants. In this sense, and in this sense only, such
knowledge might afford an answer to the action. It does not do
so in point of law; and in the present case, on the finding of the
jury it does not do so in point of fact: I am therefore of opinion
that tile Court of Exchequer were right in refusing to disturb the
verdict f'or the plaintiff.
WIIGI. ITI-, J.-I agree with the conclusion which has been expressed by the Lord Chief Justice that the judgment should be
affirmed, but I do not entirely concur in all the reasons he has
assigned. The case is divided into two points, the statutory obligation upon the mill-owner to keep the machinery fenced, and the
contract said to be existing between the master and the servant. I
attribute more importance to the statutory obligation than has been
put upon it by my Lord. But I do not think it necessary to say
more than that I concur in the general result of the opinion which
he has expressed.

CRo 'o.-N, J.-I arrive at the same conclusion. It seems to me
the only question really reserved to us in this case is, whether the
mere k.owledge of the danger by the plaintiff, when he did the act
which produced the consequences complained of, is a sufficient bar
to his recovering for the injury, which he received from the clearlyestaM.lshcd negligence and default of the defendant. Hlere, I
think, we mus4t take it, on the ruling which is not complained of,
and on the verdict of the jury, that there was default or negligence
on tue part of the defendant for which he would be answerable. I
do not think it is now necessary for us to consider whether the defendant's liability arises from his disobedience to the statute or
from ns negligence. There was plenty of evidence of negligence
on his part: at all events, the proof was left to the jury. It is not
nece,.ary for us ncw to consider whether the judgment of PNnKE,
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B., in the case cited with respect to the construction of the statute,
and which is almost directly in point, as far as it goes, is 6orrect.
We must now take it that there was a cause of action arising from
the negligence of the defendant, unless the ground taken by the
learned counsel for the defendant can be maintained, that the mere
knowledge by the plaintiff of the dangerous nature of the service
prevented his having a right of action. I found my judgment principally upon the two following propositions - first, that there is no
defence to the action under the rule of law as established in Priestley vs. .Fowler and other cases of that kind ; and, secondly, that
there is no defence under the notion that the plaintiff has contributed to the injury by his own negligence. The plea alleges
that the plaintiff contributed to this injury by his own negligence.
That altogether was negatived, but the plea contained an averment
that the plaintiff knew of the nature of the danger, and the question is, is that alone a sufficient answer to the action ? In -Priestley
vs. Fowler and all that class of cases, a limitation was put upon the
general rule of law that entitles a party injured to bring an action.
It was considered that this rule was subject to an exception, and
that as a person entering on a duty or employment must be necessarily supposed to have contemplated the ordinary danger arising
from the scope of the employment, and including in it that arising
from any misconduct of a fellow-servant, he could not recover from
his master if any injury arose to him from such a cause. Some
talk of a contract between master and servant : I, however, do not
suppose any such contract really to exist. But the workman enters
his service with an understanding of what the nature of the employment is ; and he cannot expect to be indemnified against the
ordinary risks attending it, or against that result from the carelessness of fellow-servants. But when that exception was established,
there arose almost necessarily a most sound distinction which one
ought never to lose sight of; namely, that where the negligence was
brought home to the master, the exception did not apply. I have
already said that we need not in this case consider whether it was
personal negligence of the master. We must take it that it was
assumed that there was personal negligence in him. I should be

IIO1.MES vs.- CLARKE.

inclined to hold, if it were necessary in accordance with what has
fallen from my Lord, that it is negligence in the master, if he does
not take care that the machines are properly fenced ; and that
where the duty is delegated to a manager the master would be
equally liable. In. this case we must take it that the defendant
had committed conduct for which he was responsible, unless the
second defence arises. What is that defence? It is said that the
mere knowledge of the danger by the plaintiff is a sufficient defence
to tl,2 action. I certainly cannot think so. It is urged that the
plairtiff cannot recover, if he has contributed to the accident, that
is, it would not have happened to him, though the defendant was
negligent, if he had used ordinary care. I quite agree with the
last observations of my Lord, that the knowledge of the danger is
only a part of the question of negligence; one part perhaps out
of a hundred that must be considered. It is very often a question
of degree whether there is negligence or not. It occurred to me
during the argument-suppose a man knows very well that there
is great danger in going to open a trap in a coal-mine, but that
the lives of a hundred men depend on its being opened, and be
knows that the duty of opening the trap has devolved on him, and
he goes and does it and incurs injury, is he guilty of negligence?
You mnist always balance one consideration against another, and
the j;iry must say whether on looking at all the matters there is
neali-.nee. Take the case of a man crossing the street if an
omnibus is very near; it may be negligence in him to do so; if he
is an active young man and likely to get over, it may be otherwise.
I am much strengthened in this view by the observation of Lord
CAMPBELL in Senior vs. Ward. Upon these grounds, I tlink the
judgment of the Court below ought to be affirmed.
WIm.Er J.-I am of the same opinion. I entirely agree with
what has been already stated by my learned brother WIGITMAN,
and I need not say more.
J.-I am of opinion that the judgment of the Court of
Exchequer must be affirmed. This is a case of very great importBYLrE-,
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ance, and I am anxious that this decision should repose on what
seems to me the true ground. I do not rest the right of the plaintiff to recover on the statutable obligation incumbent on the master
to fence the machinery, nor yet on the personal knowledge of the
master that the machinery was improperly left unfenced, though
I do not intend to insinuate any disagreement with the Court of
Exchequer. But I think the master liable on the broad ground, to
wit, that the owner of dangerous machinery is bound to exercise
due care that it is in a safe and proper condition. The case of
Priestleyvs. Fowler introduced a new chapter to the law, but that
case has since been recognised by all the Courts, including the
Courts of error and the House of Lords. So that the doctrine laid
down, with all the consequences fairly deducible from it, is part of
the law of the land. But the principles laid down in Priestley vs.
Powler, and all the examples given of their application, relate to
the circumstances and casualties of ordinary or domestic life, and
ought not to be strained so as to regulate the rights and liabilities
arising from the use of dangerous machinery. It is, in such cases,
impossible that a workman can judge of the condition of a complex and dangerous machine wielding irresistible mechanical power:
and if he could, he is quite incapable of estimating the degree of
risk involved in reference to the condition of the machine; but the
master may be able, and generably is able, to estimate both. The
master, again, is a volunteer; a workman ordinarily has no choice.
To hold that the master is responsible to his workmen for no
absence of care however flagrant, seems to me in the highest
degree both unjust and inconvenient. On the other hand, to hold
that the master warrants the safety and proper condition of the
machinery is equally unjust to the master, for no degree of care
can insure perfect safety; and it is equally inconvenient, for who
would employ such machines, if he were an insurer? It seems to
me that the true rule lies midway between these extremes, and 1
therefore agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Lord Chief
Justice. The master is neither on the one hand at liberty to neglect all care, nor on the other is he to insure safety, but he is to
use due and reasonable care. The degree and nature of that care
are to be estimated on a consideration of the facts of each par.
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ticular case; I do not say that the degree of care is in all cases
the same as the master must observe towards strangers. This
rule seems to me the only rule consistent with justice and public convenience, but I do not rest it on those considerations alone.
It reposes on very high authority. Lord CRAXWORTH, in delivering the judgment of the House of Lords, in the Barton's Hill
Coal Company vs. Reid, states that in the case of dangerous
machinery the master is bound to exercise due care. It is true
that this was a Scotch case; but in that very case the law of
Scotland and the law of England were held to be the same in
this branch of the law of master and servant. It may be true
that some of the cases cited at the bar are not quite consistent
with this rule, particularly those which seem to make the personal
misconduct or personal knowledge of the master a necessary ingredient in his responsibility. But we are, in a Court of error, at
liberty to decide on principle and fortified by higher authority.
Why may not the master be guilty of negligence by his manager
or agent, whose employment may be so distinct from that of the
injured servant that they cannot with propriety be deemed fellowservants ? And if a master's personal knowledge of defects in his
machinery be necessary to his liability, the more the master neglects
his business and abandons it to others, the less will he be liable.
It is said that the verdict exempting the servant from the charge
of negligence is inconsistent with the fact that he knew the
machinery to be unfenced. But knowledge is only an ingredient
in negligence. It may be that the knowledge of the servant induced him to use extra care, which care was yet insufficient to pre.
serve him from accident. Besides, a servant knowing the facts
may be utterly ignorant of the risk. Lastly, the original contract
of the servant was to work with fenced machinery, and it was his
master and not he that violated the condition, and in s6 doing
exercised a species of compulsion over the servant. For these
reasons, I think the plaintiff entitled to our judgment.
KEATING, J.-I concur in the judgment that the judgment of
The Court below should be affirmed. I do so for the reasons already
Judgment affirmed.
expressed by the Lord Chief Justice.

